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WHEN GUN CONTROL MEETS THE
CONSTITUTION
KEVIN M. CU NINGHAM, ESQ.*
Sheriff Richard Mack of Graham County, Arizona disapproves
of gun control laws, and especially does not like the Brady Hand-
gun Violence Prevention Act ("Brady Act").' Nor does he like the
federal government telling him how to run his sheriff's office.
Graham County, located in the lower southeast corner of the
state, approximately 100 miles east of Tucson, encompasses over
4,500 square miles and is populated by about 28,000 residents.
With only twelve sworn officers-himself included-to patrol this
county's vast expanse of American desert and protect its inhabit-
ants, Sheriff Mack believes the job is plenty big enough to keep
him and his deputies busy without -additional duties being thrust
upon him from Washington.
So, earlier this year when Sheriff Mack received notice from the
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms ("BATF") directing him,
under the newly-enacted Brady Act, to conduct background checks
on county residents wanting to purchase handguns,2 he sued to
have the law declared unconstitutional. 3 More importantly, he
won,4 and in so doing, never used the words "Second Amendment."
This Article examines the relationship between Congress and
the states in the context of national gun control. It traces the his-
tory of Second Amendment challenges and examines the flawed
policy behind the enactment of the Brady Act. Finally, the Article
analyzes how other constitutional protections, most notably the
* Kevin Cunningham is a graduate of the University of Arkansas School of Law and a
member of the Virginia State Bar. Formerly an Army Paratrooper with the 82d Airborne
Division, he is currently serving as Assistant General Counsel for the National Rifle Associ-
ation of America.
1 18 U.S.C. § 922(s) (1994).
2 Id. (requiring chief law enforcement officer to make reasonable efforts to ascertain,
within five business days, whether receipt or possession of firearm by applicant violates
Brady Act).
8 Mack v. United States, 856 F. Supp. 1372, 1374 (D. Ariz. 1994) (seeking injunctive and
declaratory relief from 18 U.S.C. § 922(s) (1994)).
4 Mack, 856 F. Supp. at 1384 (granting in part, request for injunctive relief and declaring
18 U.S.C. § 922(s) (1994) unconstitutional).
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Tenth Amendment, can be successfully utilized to check the rapid
expanse of the federal government in this hotly-debated area.
I. FAULTY LEGISLATION
With the passage of the Brady Act5-about seven years after
first being introduced in Congress-gun control advocates claimed
a major victory in the war on crime and guns. Supporters, how-
ever, quickly recharacterized the measure as only a first step in
stemming gun violence-acknowledging the many shortcomings
of the Brady Act and attempting to garner support for even more
restrictive measures.6 Based upon what is known about the na-
ture of violent crime, the Brady Act has a rather dismal promise
for success. The Brady Act also calls into question whether Con-
gress has exceeded its authority in requiring the states to carry
out the terms of the legislation. Given what is known about crime
and the criminal acquisition of firearms, readers should ask the
same questions Sheriff Mack did: Will the Brady Act effectively
stem criminal access to firearms? And, more importantly, is it
good public policy and grounded in the Constitution? The answer
to both questions is a resounding no.
The Brady Act was named after former White House press sec-
retary James Brady who was critically injured in John Hinckley's
1981 assassination attempt on President Ronald Reagan. The leg-
islation represents a watered-down attempt by Congress to im-
pose a waiting period and background check on persons wishing to
purchase handguns from federally licensed gun dealers in states
that had not previously regulated the issue to Congress's satisfac-
tion. The law does not, for example, lessen California's fifteen-day
waiting period,7 nor does it alter the instantaneous background
checks used in Virginia8 and Delaware. 9 Those states which lack
5 18 U.S.C. § 922(s) (1994).
6 Brady Act II has already been introduced in the Senate by Senator Howard Metzen-
baum, see S. 1878, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994), and in the House of Representatives by
Representative Charles Schumer, see H.R. 3932, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994), as the Gun
Violence Prevention Act of 1994.
7 CAL. PENAL CODE § 12071(BX3XA) (West 1992) (providing that prior to January 1,
1996, no firearm shall be delivered within 15 days of application for purchase).
8 VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-308.2:2 (Michie Supp. 1994) (requiring prospective firearm pur-
chaser to consent to have dealers obtain criminal history information prior to sale).
9 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1448A (Supp. 1992) (seller shall not deliver firearm until
obtaining completed consent form and performing background check).
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an instant check or waiting period of at least five days' ° are forced
to implement a mandatory five-day waiting period for the purpose
of allowing state law enforcement agencies to conduct a criminal
background check on would-be handgun purchasers from federally
licensed gun dealers. In so doing, the Brady Act not only raises
significant constitutional questions regarding infringements on
the right to keep and bear arms, but also the collateral issues of
states' rights, unfunded mandates, and impermissible federalism.
A. The Brady Act is Simply Not Workable
Like other gun control laws, the Brady Act was sold to the
American public as a "common sense" crime-fighting measure
designed in part to keep handguns out of the wrong hands. Com-
mendable? Absolutely. Workable? Absolutely not.
Research confirms what common sense has long told us:
Criminals do not, to any appreciable degree, buy handguns from
federally licensed firearms dealers. Thus, almost by definition,
criminals are outside the scope and reach of the Brady Act's provi-
sions, since it is highly unlikely that they would seek to procure
their guns from legitimate dealers in the first place. As espoused
by Professors James D. Wright and Peter H. Rossi in their book
Armed and Considered Dangerous:" "More predatory criminals,
acquiring a handgun specifically for use in crime, heavily ex-
ploited informal, off-the-record means and sources and rarely
went through customary retail channels."12 Based on prison
surveys of over 2,000 convicted felons, Wright and Rossi found
that roughly sixteen percent of all firearms owned by felons were
obtained from legitimate sources.' 3 Furthermore, only about
seven percent of handguns owned by violent felons were obtained
through legitimate channels.' 4 Thus, felons generally avoided re-
tail outlets, and the more predatory felons were especially likely to
do so.' 5 Since the vast majority of felons generally, and violent
felons in particular, do not acquire handguns from licensed deal-
10 See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6111 (1984) (Pennsylvania's 48-hour waiting period will
be increased to five days).
11 JAMEs D. WRIGHT & PETER H. Rossi, ARMED AND CONSIDERED DANGEROUS: A SURVEY
OF FELONS AND THEm FIREARMS (1986).
12 Id. at 187.
13 Id. at 185.
14 Id. at 186.
15 Id.
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ers, the Brady Act will only minimally curtail transfers to this
class of disqualified persons even if it otherwise works exactly as it
was designed to.
Disqualifying only persons with existing records of felony con-
victions or involuntary mental commitments from purchasing
guns is yet another limitation on the effectiveness of the Brady
Act. 16 Many states do not have complete, accurate, up-to-date
computerized records which track dispositions of criminal
charges. Such inadequacy not only leads to wrongful denials for
persons charged and later acquitted of criminal conduct, but also
leads to failures in identifying those persons who have been con-
victed of a felony or involuntarily committed-who are thus
barred by federal law from purchasing or possessing firearms.
Furthermore, the Brady Act does not hinder the acquisition of
handguns by persons who engage in criminal activity but evade
arrest or conviction. Nor can this law identify and alert authori-
ties of those persons who may be mentally unstable, drug abusers,
or others for whom complete criminal or mental information does
not exist, or is not readily discoverable.
17
B. Congress Exceeding Its Granted Authority
Is it proper for the federal government to require state law en-
forcement agencies to spend time and resources conducting back-
ground checks on overwhelmingly law-abiding citizens? Several
reasons suggest that it is not. One can conclude from economic
and criminal justice considerations alone that the policies behind
the Brady Act are badly flawed. As Sheriff Mack testified, supply-
ing the money, equipment, and manpower to conduct background
checks drains resources from already overburdened law enforce-
ment agencies-like the Graham County Sheriff's Office-many
of which are already experiencing critical shortages due to the
ever increasing crime rate coupled with fiscal constraints driven
by state, county, and municipal budgetary cutbacks. Additionally,
the officers needed to perform the background checks, and accom-
panying paperwork reduces the number of officers available for
street duty-where the likelihood that serious criminal activity
16 18 U.S.C. § 922(sX3XB) (1994).
17 See Gray v. San Francisco Gun Exch., 207 Cal. App. 3d 151, 153 (Ct. App. 1989)
(mental patient circumvented 15-day waiting period and later committed murder).
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will be detected or deterred is far greater. Finally, although per-
haps more subtly, police and legislators are sending a message to
criminals that "we would rather spend our time investigating law-
abiding citizens than trying to catch real criminals like you."
C. Other Problems With the Brady Act
It can also be argued that free access to firearms should be pro-
moted, not hampered, as a crime fighting tool. Florida State Uni-
versity Professor Gary Kleck explains that civilians lawfully use
privately-owned firearms to defend themselves against criminal
attack up to 2.4 million times per year, and such defensive uses
significantly outnumber the criminal uses of firearms in
America.18 Therefore, from a utilitarian standpoint, gun laws such
as the Brady Act which make it more cumbersome to lawfully ac-
quire firearms, actually hinder citizens' ability to protect them-
selves from crime.
Finally, no law can help law enforcement agencies predict who
will commit a crime. Recent history is replete with accounts of
persons who legally purchased firearms after undergoing a
lengthy background investigation, only to perpetrate some horrific
act of violence at a future date. Among these are Patrick Purdy
who murdered five children and wounded thirty in a schoolyard
shooting in Stockton, California in 1989; 19 and Colin Ferguson,
the convicted gunman who shot twenty-five passengers, killing
six, on the Long Island Railroad outside New York City last De-
cember.20 Both Purdy and Ferguson had purchased firearms in
California, complying with the state's fifteen-day waiting period,
and apparently passing the required background checks before ob-
taining the weapons ultimately used in the murders of eleven peo-
ple and the wounding of many more.
18 J. Neil Schulman, Q and A-Guns, Crime, and Self-Defense, ORANGE CoINrY REG.,
Sept. 19, 1993, at C3 (summarizing Dr. Kleck's findings in his "National Self-Defense
Survey").
19 See Nelson Kempsky et al., A Report to Attorney General John K. Van de Kamp on
Patrick Edward Purdy and the Cleveland School Killings 2 (1989) (on file with author).
Although Purdy purchased the rifle used in the shootings in Oregon, he carried with him-
and committed suicide with-a handgun purchased in California only weeks before the
January 17th shootings. Id. at 5-6.
20 Christine Spolar & Jessica Crosby, Driver's License Was Key to Suspect's Gun
Purchase, WAS. PosT, Dec. 10, 1993, at A15 (Ferguson used temporary motel address
which was never verified; state granted permission to sell to Ferguson since he had no
criminal record).
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California's stringent waiting period did not prevent these trag-
edies, nor could it have done so. At the time they purchased the
firearms, both Purdy and Ferguson had felony-free records-
although Purdy had several felony arrests that had been plea-bar-
gained to misdemeanors by a revolving-door criminal justice
system.
Even John Hinckley, Jr., whose deranged criminal act spawned
the birth of the Brady Act, could not have been discovered during
a background check. At the time he bought the handgun later
used to shoot President Reagan, James Brady, and two law en-
forcement agents, Hinckley had no felony record; no record of in-
voluntary commitment for mental disease or defect; nor was he a
fugitive from justice or other person disqualified under the federal
law from purchasing firearms. 2 1 Hinckley, however, had a prior
federal felony arrest for attempting to board a passenger aircraft
with three handguns in his possession-a charge that was also
plea-bargained to a misdemeanor. Hinckley paid a $50 fine,
$12.50 in court costs, and forfeited the firearms-only to walk
away and resurface months later at the Washington Hilton Hotel
on March 30, 1981, re-armed and obviously more careful as to how
he transported his weapons.22
The Brady Act will not work as envisioned so long as prosecu-
tors are empowered to plea-bargain felony offenses down to misde-
meanors-provided every other part of the system works the way
it is designed to. The chance that the Brady Act will succeed, and
thus deny felons access to firearms, is further diminished by the
likelihood of mistakes, clerical errors, faulty recordkeeping and re-
trieval, and a host of other maladies associated with governmental
bureaucracies. Meanwhile, law-abiding persons become even
more discouraged when the government's only answer to this di-
lemma is more calls for gun control, not less.
Even if the Brady Act could have prevented some of these so-
called random acts of violence-which we have previously shown
to be virtually impossible-is this type of law a legitimate legisla-
tive act of the federal government, or, as Sheriff Mack believes,
has Congress gone too far in imposing its will on the states? The
21 United States v. Hinkley, 672 F.2d 115, 119 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (affirming district court's
suppression order).
22 Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Bail and Trial Transcript at 1559, United States
v. Hinckley, 525 F. Supp. 1342 (D.D.C. 1981) (No. 81-306).
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question is not what power the federal government should have,
but rather, what powers in fact have been given by the people?23
Gun control proponents are quick to point out that no federal
court has invalidated a gun control law on Second Amendment
grounds 24-presumably as their justification or rationale for en-
acting even more restrictive measures in the future. Yet, even as
this Article goes to print, several federal district courts have al-
ready struck down certain provisions of the Brady Act as being
violative of the Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion.2 5 In a similar vein, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit struck down the Gun Free School Zones Act 26 for
failing to allege a sufficient nexus to the Commerce Clause.27
Therefore, simply because the Supreme Court has never squarely
dealt with the Second Amendment issue does not render the
Brady Act safe from constitutional challenge under a number of
other legal theories.
II. THE HISTORY OF GUN CONTROL
In order to comprehend fully the constitutional implications
triggered by the enactment of gun control laws in general, and the
Brady Act in particular, a brief look back into history is required.
The Second Amendment to the United States Constitution pro-
vides that: "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the secur-
ity of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms
shall not be infringed."21
For the approximate 150-year period from the founding of this
country in 1789 until 1939, only four cases were decided by the
23 See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 63 (1936) (noting Congress only has power
provided by Constitution).
24 But see Robert Dowlut, Federal and State Constitutional Guarantees to Arms, 15 U.
DAYTON L. REv. 59, 79 (1989) (observing that state courts have voided laws on Second
Amendment grounds on 21 prior occasions).
25 See Mack v. United States, 856 F. Supp. 1372, 1381 (D. Ariz. 1994) (mandating state
officials to perform background checks exceeds congressional authority and violates Tenth
Amendment); see also McGee v. United States, 863 F. Supp. 321, 327 (S.D. Miss. 1994)
(holding it unconstitutional for Congress to direct and compel local sheriffs to carry out
Brady provisions); Frank v. United States, 860 F. Supp. 1030, 1042 (D. Vt. 1994) (holding
Federal Statutory Program requirement of Brady Act unconstitutional); Printz v. United
States, 854 F. Supp. 1503, 1519 (D. Mont. 1994) (declaring background check provision
unconstitutional).
26 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1XA) (1994).
27 United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1367-68 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct.
1536 (1994).
28 U.S. CONST. amend. II.
1994]
66 ST. JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY
United States Supreme Court interpreting the meaning of the
Second Amendment.2 9 Three of these cases, Cruikshank, Presser,
and Miller v. Texas, while nominally decided on Second Amend-
ment grounds, in truth, dealt with only peripheral issues related
to firearms and did not squarely ascribe any significant meaning
to the Second Amendment. A fifth case, Dred Scott v. Sanford,3 °
while predating all federal Second Amendment jurisprudence,
was nonetheless important in defining the parameters of the Sec-
ond Amendment as a right of citizenship:
More especially, it cannot be believed that the large slave-
holding states regarded them as included in the word "citi-
zens" or would have consented to a constitution which might
compel them to receive them in that character from another
state. For if they were so received, and entitled to the privi-
leges and immunities of citizens... [i]t would give to citizens
of the negro race, who were recognized as citizens in any one
state of the Union, the right to enter every other state wher-
ever they pleased, singly or in companies, without pass or
passport . . . and it would give to them the full liberty of
speech in public and in private, upon all subjects upon which
its own citizens might speak; to hold public meetings upon
political affairs, and to keep and carry arms wherever they
went.3 1
The predominant reason no Second Amendment jurisprudence
developed during this period was that the United States had few,
if any, laws aimed at controlling the manufacture, possession, or
sale of any type of firearms. The laws that did exist were gener-
ally state statutes designed to prevent weapons from reaching the
hands of slaves,3 2 or local ordinances aimed at controlling the be-
havior of drunken cowboys in frontier border towns.
29 See United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939) (declaring Second Amendment
does not guarantee citizens right to bear shotgun having barrel of less than 18 inches);
Miller v. Texas, 153 U.S. 535, 538 (1894) (ruling Texas statute prohibiting carrying of dan-
gerous weapons not denial of Second Amendment rights); Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252,
264 (1886) (holding states cannot prohibit United States from maintaining public security
in allowing citizens right to bear arms as reserved military); United States v. Cruikshank,
92 U.S. 542, 553 (1875) (stating only real effect of Second Amendment is to restrict powers
of national government, leaving people to look for protection from local government). See
generally DAVID T. HARDY, ORIGINs AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT passim(1986) (discussing history of Second Amendment).
30 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
s1 Id. at 416-17.
32 See id. at 420.
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Most early judicial opinions concerning the right to keep and
bear arms were state court decisions interpreting parallel provi-
sions of state constitutions.33 This remained largely the status quo
until the passage of the National Firearms Act of 1934 ("NFA).14
The NFA was the first major attempt by Congress to regulate any
aspect of the firearms issue on a wholesale basis. The NFA was
passed in response to the growing criminal misuse of fully auto-
matic weapons by members of organized crime during the era of
Prohibition.
In its approach to firearms control, the NFA was patterned after
the previously enacted Harrison Narcotics Act,3 5 which was based
upon the taxing authority of the federal government. 36 The NFA
applied only to machine guns, submachine guns, sawed-off rifles,
sawed-off shotguns, gadget guns disguised to resemble some inno-
cent device, gun silencers, and the like.37 While all of the now-
regulated commodities encompassed by the NFA remained per-
fectly legal for citizens to own-at least under federal law-a spe-
cial tax was attached to each and every transaction involving the
transfer of weapons within the purview of the NFA. Additionally,
the NFA created, for the first time, a central registry of all weap-
ons delineated by the NFA which was (and still is) maintained by
the Department of the Treasury's BATF. According to Robert
Kukla:
The reason the [NFA] had been established under the tax-
ing powers of the Federal Government was because the nar-
cotics legislation, which had been set up along similar lines,
had already been successfully court-tested as to its constitu-
tionality in the lawful exercise of Federal taxing power. It
must be remembered that such a circuitous route was neces-
sary in the opinion of the then U.S. Attorney General, Homer
S. Cummings, because of a two-fold problem. There was no
constitutional grant of police powers to the Federal Govern-
ment. There was the glaring presence of the Second Amend-
ment to the Constitution, combined with the embarrassing
33 See Bliss v. Commonwealth, 12 Ky. (2 Litt.) 90, 93 (1822) (striking down 1813 con-
cealed carry prohibition as violative of state constitutional guarantee); cf Nunn v. State, 1
Ga. 243, 251 (1846) (declaring 1837 pistol ban violated federal constitutional amendment).
84 26 U.S.C. § 5801 (1988).
35 Pub. L. No. 63-323, 38 Stat. 785 (1914) (repealed 1970).
86 See ROBERT J. KuLA, GUN CONTROL 71 (Harlon B. Carter ed., 1973).
37 Id.
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appropriateness of machine guns and submachine guns to
any conceivable militia.3 8
A. Origins of the Modern Gun Control Debate
The origins of the modern gun control debate can be traced to a
rather ambiguous decision rendered in United States v. Miller,3 9
which is an outgrowth of the NFA and the only case to date that
squarely addressed the issue of whether citizens have an unen-
cumbered right to own and possess firearms of their choosing. The
problem is that while Miller brought the question of the meaning
of the Second Amendment before the Supreme Court, the Court
did not answer the question in terms anyone could readily com-
prehend-thus setting the stage for political debates for the next
fifty-five years. Due to the uncertainty created by this decision, a
closer look at just what Miller said, and did not say, is in order.
Jack Miller and Frank Layton were indicted in the United
States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas for
transporting, in interstate commerce, a double-barreled twelve
gauge shotgun having a barrel less than eighteen inches in length
(i.e., a sawed-off shotgun) without having registered the weapon
or possessing the tax-stamped documents as required by the
NFA.40 At trial, the defendants demurred, alleging that the NFA
was "not a revenue measure but an attempt to usurp police power
reserved to the States,"41 and that "it offend[ed] the inhibition of
the Second Amendment to the Constitution."42 The district court
concluded that section eleven of the NFA violated the Second
Amendment, and quashed the indictments.43 The Government
then appealed directly to the Supreme Court, but Miller and Lay-
ton, having felt vindicated by the district court, did not appear,
either in person or by counsel. Thus, perhaps the most important
Second Amendment case to come before the Supreme Court was
38 Id.
39 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
40 Id. at 175.
41 Id. at 176.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 175-77 n.1. See 26 U.S.C. § 1132(11) (1934). This provision provides: "It shall be
unlawful for any person who is required to register as provided in section 5 hereof and who
shall not have so registered, or any other person who has not in his possession a stamp-
affixed order as provided in section 4 hereof, to ship, carry, or deliver any firearm in inter-
state commerce." Id.
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decided only on the brief and oral argument of the Government in
what amounted to an ex parte proceeding. Even with this advan-
tage, however, the Government did not win a clear-cut victory.
The Court held:
In the absence of any evidence tending to show that posses-
sion or use of a "shotgun having a barrel of less than eighteen
inches in length" at this time has some reasonable relation-
ship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated mili-
tia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment guarantees
the right to keep and bear such an instrument. Certainly it is
not within judicial notice that this weapon is any part of the
ordinary military equipment or that its use could contribute
to the common defense. 44
Did the Court intend to imply that the weapon would be pro-
tected under the Second Amendment if Miller or Layton appeared
and offered some evidence that the sawed-off shotgun did have
some military application (as anyone who fought in the trenches of
World War I could attest)? Or, was the Court looking for a consti-
tutionally permissible way to restrict access to certain firearms
through a limited reading of the Second Amendment?
B. Other Gun Control Legislation
While the passage of the NFA in 1934 marked the beginning of
the modern era of gun control at the national level, it was cer-
tainly not the only legislative foray into the field. The NFA was
followed almost immediately by the 1938 Federal Firearms Act,45
and thirty years later by the enactment the Gun Control Act of
1968 ("GCA7).46 Passed in the aftermath of the assassinations of
Senator Robert Kennedy and Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., the
GCA brought sweeping changes to the body of law governing fire-
arms. For the first time, federal law now prohibited mail order
sales of firearms; restricted access to approved classes of persons;
prohibited interstate sales of handguns; and set minimum ages to
44 United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939) (quoting Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn.(2 Hum.) 154, 158 (1840)). The remainder of the opinion merely traces the historical origins
and composition of "the militia" without further elaboration as to the meaning of the Sec-
ond Amendment itself. Id.
45 Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1250 (1938) (repealed 1968, current version codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-928 (1994)).
46 18 U.S.C. § 921 (1968) (the Gun Control Act of 1968 replaced Federal Firearms Act,
which was repealed in 1968).
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purchase handguns, rifles, and shotguns. 4 7 The Brady Act brought
further federal restrictions mandating a five-day waiting period
and background check for would-be handgun purchasers.48 Addi-
tionally, just last August, Congress passed the Violent Crime and
Law Enforcement Act of 1994,'4 which will ban nineteen semiau-
tomatic firearms by name, and scores of additional firearms by
definition.5 0 All told, there are now over 20,000 federal, state, and
local laws which control some aspect of the possession, manufac-
ture, sale, or use of firearms.
III. THE BRADY ACT
It is against this backdrop that Congress enacted the Brady Act
in the latter part of 1993, and set the stage for Sheriff Mack's law-
suit. Failing to heed the Supreme Court's warning one year ear-
lier in New York v. United States52 that under the Tenth Amend-
ment, Congress may not conscript state governments as
Congress's agents,53 congressional drafters nonetheless included
within the Brady Act a background check requirement. This pro-
vision requires the "chief law enforcement officer" ("CLEO)5 4 in
each jurisdiction to make a "reasonable effort to ascertain
whether receipt or possession [of a handgun by the prospective
buyer] would be in violation of the law, including research in
whatever State and local recordkeeping systems are available and
in a national system designated by the Attorney General."5 5
Under the statutory scheme of the Brady Act, the CLEO per-
forms the background check on the basis of a sworn statement
which the prospective purchaser provides to the gun dealer and
47 18 U.S.C. § 921 (1968); see also 114 CONG. REc. 27,464 (1968) (statement of Sen. Dodd
indicating limitations on mail order purchases of weapons was new provision).
48 18 U.S.C. § 922(sXl) (1994).
49 Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994).
50 Id. § 110102(b).
51 See Ronald Lewis, Outlawing Guns Is No Remedy, Tmms-PcAyu-E (New Orleans),
Oct. 12, 1993, at B6 (noting criminals thrive on prohibited goods).
52 New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2429 (1992) (invalidating take-title provi-
sion of Low-Level Radioactive Waste Act of 1985, 42 U.S.C. § 2021c(aX)(1A) (Supp. V
1993)).
53 112 S. Ct. at 2432. [Wlhere the government directs the state to regulate, it may be
state officials who will bear the brunt of public disapproval." Id.
54 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(8) (1994). Chief law enforcement officer is defined under the Brady
Act as "the chief of police, the sheriff, or an equivalent officer or the designee of any such
individual." Id.
5 18 U.S.C. § 922(s2) (1994).
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the gun dealer in turn provides to the CLEO.56 The CLEO must
destroy the sworn statement within twenty days of the date of the
transfer unless the CLEO determines that the transfer would vio-
late the law.57 If the CLEO determines that the transfer would
violate the law, the CLEO must, within twenty days of a request,
provide reasons to the denied purchaser for that determination. 58
The Brady Act also amended the penalty provision of the existing
federal criminal code by providing that anyone who knowingly vio-
lates its provisions shall be subject to a fine, imprisonment, or
both.59
A. Sheriff Mack Challenging the Brady Act
Sheriff Mack feared that he could be held criminally liable if he
did not perform the background checks required by the Brady Act.
At the same time, he was worried that he would anger citizens
and voters if he did perform the checks. Sheriff Mack determined
that he simply had no choice and brought suit in the United States
District Court for Arizona to enjoin enforcement of the Brady
Act.60
According to Judge David M. Roll: "The issue is not, however,
whether Congress possesses the raw power to regulate [under the
Commerce Clause] the transfer of handguns. Clearly it does. The
thorny question is whether the Tenth Amendment limits the
power of Congress to regulate in the way it has chosen."61 Relying
heavily on the language of New York v. United States, 2 Mack's
suit alleged, in part, that the Brady Act is an unconstitutional in-
vasion of states' rights under the Tenth Amendment. 3 In addition
to his Tenth Amendment claim, Mack alleged that requiring the
CLEO to make a "reasonable" attempt to conduct a background
check-without defining that term further-was so vague as to
56 Id. § 922(sX1)(AXi)(III).
57 Id. § 922(sX5)(BXi).
58 Id. § 922(sX6)(C).
59 18 U.S.C. § 924(aX5) (1994) (stating that fine shall not exceed $1,000 and imprison-
ment shall not exceed one year).
60 Mack v. United States, 856 F. Supp. 1372, 1375-76 (D. Ariz. 1994).
61 Id. at 1379.
62 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992).
63 Mack, 856 F. Supp. at 1378. The Tenth Amendment provides: "The powers not dele-
gated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are re-
served to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X
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violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.64 Finally,
Mack argued that forcing him to conduct the background checks
under threat of legal sanctions, but without remuneration or reim-
bursement, amounted to "involuntary servitude" in violation of
the Thirteenth Amendment. 5
Discussing the Tenth Amendment claim, Judge Roll noted:
The district court for the District of Montana [having just de-
cided a challenge to the Brady Act in Printz which was nearly
identical to this one] framed the inquiry as follows: "This case
turns on the proper relationship between the federal govern-
ment and the several states, and in particular, on the consti-
tutionality of federally imposed, unfunded mandates to the
States."66
In New York, the Supreme Court "reviewed the history of the
decisional law construing the delicate balance struck between the
federalist compromise and a state's authority."67 Writing for the
majority in New York, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor posited that
"while Congress has substantial power under the Constitution to
encourage the States[,]... the Constitution does not confer upon
Congress the ability to compel the States .... -68 Justice O'Connor,
describing the limitations imposed on Congress by the Tenth
Amendment, stated: "Where a federal interest is sufficiently
strong to cause Congress to legislate, it must do so directly; it may
not conscript state governments as its agents."69
The statute at issue in New York was the Low-Level Radioactive
Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 (the "Low-Level Waste
Act").70 The Low-Level Waste Act "offered state governments the
choice of either regulating pursuant to Congressional dictates or
accepting ownership of low level radioactive waste."71 The New
York Court found that portion of the statute invalid under the
64 856 F. Supp. at 1381.
65 Id. at 1382. The Thirteenth Amendment provides that "[nleither slavery nor involun-
tary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted, shall exist within the United States, or anyplace subject to their jurisdiction."
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
66 Mack, 856 F. Supp. at 1379 (quoting Printz v. United States, 854 F. Supp. 1503, 1506-
07 (D. Mont. 1994)).
67 Mack, 856 F. Supp. at 1379.
68 112 S. Ct. at 2414.
69 Id. at 2429.
70 42 U.S.C. § 2021b (1988).
71 Mack, 856 F. Supp. at 1379.
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Tenth Amendment because it "commandeer[ed] the legislative
processes of the States by directly compelling them to enact and
enforce a federal regulatory program."72
Similarly, when striking down the background check portion of
the Brady Act, Judge Roll noted that Congress was again imper-
missibly attempting to directly compel the enforcement of a
federal regulatory program by requiring the CLEOs to perform
criminal background checks-using their own departmental re-
sources-under the threat of criminal and/or civil penalties.
"Such a command [from Congress] would clearly involve the type
of government conduct found to be unconstitutional in New York
v. United States."73 Thus, Sheriff Mack prevailed on his Tenth
Amendment claim, and the background check provision of the
Brady Act was ruled unconstitutional.74
Sheriff Mack also prevailed on his Fifth Amendment claim
which arose out of the Brady Act's requirement that a CLEO make
a "reasonable effort" to perform a background check within five
business days. This requirement includes performing research in
a national system of records designated by the Attorney General,
as well as researching any "available" state and local records. 75
The term "reasonable effort," however, is not defined by the stat-
ute.76 It has been recognized that a statute is unconstitutionally
vague if it threatens sanctions without giving fair warning of the
conduct that is proscribed or demanded.77 Moreover, the "void for
vagueness" doctrine requires that a penal statute define the crimi-
nal offense with such definiteness that ordinary people can under-
stand what conduct is prohibited.7 8
The Government's position, directly contrary to the plain lan-
guage of the statute, was enunciated in an official opinion issued
by the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel. The Gov-
ernment contends that CLEOs were not subjected to any potential
criminal penalty, and thus, the Fifth Amendment claim was inap-
72 New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2428 (quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclama-
tion Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981)) (emphasis added).
73 Mack, 856 F. Supp. at 1380.
74 Id. at 1381 (arguing Brady Act forces states to expend time and resources).
75 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(2) (1994).
76 Mack, 856 F. Supp. at 1382.
77 See Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972) (vague laws may "tax the inno-
cent" and lead to arbitrary enforcement).
78 See United States v. Dischner, 974 F.2d 1502, 1510 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Kolender
v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983)), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1290 (1993).
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plicable. 79 Finding the Government's position "untenable" 0 and
unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause, Judge Roll ruled
the challenged requirement imprecise and indefinite. Judge Roll
stated:
The United States offers one definition to complete the void.
It insists that Sheriff Mack is not under a mandatory obliga-
tion to determine the legality of handgun transfers. The gov-
ernment's interpretation of the enforcement provisions
merely directs the CLEO to determine whether, in light of the
resources available in the specific jurisdiction, it would be rea-
sonable to conduct a background check after notice of the pro-
posed sale by a licensed gun seller. The government claims
the Act would allow ever changing obligations, as appropri-
ate, in light of individual circumstances. At various times
and through various agencies, the government has posited
that criminal sanctions do not apply to CLEOs or that crimi-
nal sanctions may apply, but only if the CLEO fails to expend
"minimal efforts" in pursuit of his or her investigatory
duties.8 '
Additionally, the Government's counsel admitted during oral ar-
gument: "And I think that [the BATF] letter makes clear and our
position makes clear that the reasonable search is vague. And it
has to be different for each Sheriff, because each Sheriff might
have a different number of Brady Acts coming in .... There are so
many different situations that reasonable search is open for inter-
pretation. And our claim here is that interpretation should be
done by the Sheriff." 2
Plaintiff's counsel, David Hardy, noted the irony of the Govern-
ment's argument in his closing argument: "I will only note that
we are also arguing vagueness here. This is the first time I ever
heard any Government stand up and take the position that a law
was essentially to be interpreted by those subject to it, and
whatever they felt was proper must be proper.""'
Sheriff Mack was not so fortunate on his Thirteenth Amend-
ment challenge. Involuntary servitude in violation of the Thir-
79 Mack, 856 F. Supp. at 1377.
80 Id. at 1382.
81 Id. at 1381-82.
82 Record at 48-49, Mack v. United States, 856 F. Supp. 1372 (D. Ariz. 1994) (No. CV 94-
113).,
83 Id. at 58.
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teenth Amendment "occurs when an individual coerces another
into.., service by improper or wrongful conduct that is intended
to cause, and does cause, the other person to believe that he or she
has no alternative but to perform the labor."84
In denying Mack's claim of involuntary servitude, Judge Roll
posited:
In United States v. Kozminski the Supreme Court found
that a conviction for violating a statute enacted to enforce the
Thirteenth Amendment required proof that the alleged vic-
tims were "forced to work for the defendant by the use or
threat of physical restraint or physical injury" or by law,
rather than merely by psychological coercion. Where as here
a person is free to refuse to work without incurring legal sanc-
tions, the Thirteenth Amendment is not violated, even if the
choice is a painful one. Mack need only quit his job to be free
of the duties imposed upon him by the Act. Under these cir-
cumstances, the Thirteenth Amendment is not implicated. 5
In sum, Sheriff Mack prevailed upon two of his three constitu-
tional claims, and the portion of the law requiring CLEOs to per-
form background checks was held unconstitutional. But, because
of a severability provision within the Act itself, the five-day wait-
ing period remained intact and enforceable in those states that did
not already have an instant check, or a waiting period of longer
than five days.8 6 In so ruling, Judge Roll specifically found that
Sheriff Mack had standing to assert his Tenth Amendment
claims ,87 and that the Brady Act was not only vague, but imper-
missibly violated the delicate balance of federal-state relations.8 8
CONCLUSION
As this Article goes to print, federal district court judges in
Montana, 9 Mississippi, 90 Texas,91 Vermont,9 2 and Arizona 93 have
84 Mack, 856 F. Supp. at 1382 (quoting Brogan v. San Mateo County, 901 F.2d 762, 764
(9th Cir. 1990)) (additional citations omitted).
85 Mack, 856 F. Supp. at 1382 (quoting United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 952
(1988)) (citations omitted).
86 Mack, 856 F. Supp. at 1383; see 18 U.S.C. § 928 (1994).
87 Mack, 856 F. Supp. at 1375-76 (noting that Mack's risk of criminal sanctions, should
he disobey the statute, is "sufficient injury" to satisfy "cases or controversies" requirement
of Article III, § 2 of U.S. Constitution).
88 856 F. Supp. at 1381.
89 Printz v. United States, 854 F. Supp. 1503 (D. Mont. 1994).
90 McGee v. United States, 863 F. Supp. 321 (S.D. Miss. 1994).
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issued rulings on challenges to the Brady Act. All of these chal-
lenges were essentially based upon identical claims. Similar law-
suits are currently pending in Louisiana and Wyoming. The re-
sults, however, have been mixed. In Texas, all portions of the law
were found constitutional. 94 Meanwhile, the Federal District
Court for the Southern District of Mississippi struck down the
background check but found that the criminal provisions did not
apply, and thus, Sheriff McGee lacked standing to pursue that
claim.95 The ruling, however, was binding on Sheriff McGee. Sim-
ilarly, the Vermont District Court held the background check pro-
vision unconstitutional under the Tenth Amendment, but limited
the scope of the ruling only to the Federal District of Vermont.96
The Montana opinion in Printz was virtually identical to Mack.97
Both found the background check provision invalid under the
Tenth Amendment, and both granted injunctive relief not only to
the respective plaintiffs, but to all chief law enforcement officers
nationwide.
Assuming that each Circuit Courts of Appeals upholds the dis-
trict court decision within that circuit, the Brady Act will almost
certainly be headed to the United States Supreme Court to resolve
the split between Koog in the Fifth Circuit, and Mack and Printz
in the Ninth Circuit. Furthermore, there will be many state offi-
cials waiting anxiously for the outcome, because the issue in these
cases is really more of unfunded federal mandates than accessibil-
ity to handguns.
And Sheriff Mack probably could not be happier.
91 Koog v. United States, 852 F. Supp. 1376 (W.D. Tex. 1994).
92 Frank v. United States, 860 F. Supp. 1030 (D. Vt. 1994).
93 Mack v. United States, 856 F. Supp. 1372 (D. Ariz 1994).
94 Koog, 852 F. Supp. at 1389 (finding that Koog lacked standing to bring Fifth Amend-
ment challenge).
95 McGee v. United States, 863 F. Supp. 321, 327 (S.D. Miss. 1994).
96 Frank, 860 F. Supp. at 1044.
97 Printz, 854 F. Supp. at 1503. Printz, however, did not reach the Fifth Amendment
claim.
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